Is neglecting the development of a U.S. missile-defense system immoral?
Twice, in this fine article, Mr. Greenfield notes the immorality of a full-throttled nuclear response to a rogue state missile attack--on either Israel or the U.S.A. He notes: "Test after successful test of anti-missile missiles shows that President Ronald Reagan’s original vision of missile defense — not the immoral and limited option of massive retaliation — has become attractive both in the United States and Europe." Then he says: "Missile threats are real and missile defense science is solid. The funding costs are actually quite low and the moral case is overwhelming."
The moral component caught my eye. The article, by the Claremont Institute's Vice President and American Studies scholar, walks you through the basics of America's missile-defense program, capabilities, and needs. The current program is being cut in the new President Obama budget--and it is somewhat amazing that anything is cut, given all the spending increases that are offered. He notes that the cut in R&D for the program is in the $10's of Billions, in a multi-Trillion dollar budget; basically, an OMB rounding error for a program that could protect Americans from 10,000's or 100,000's of deaths; economic, social, and political chaos--if not annihilation.
But program cuts in the budget are typically more in the prudential, rather than moral, realm for public policy. Budgetary decisions are difficult, and wise leaders properly prioritize. Rarely do you hear, however, that a budgetary cut or increase is "immoral."
So what is the moral case for missile defense? I believe it lies in the current defense strategy: mutually assured destruction (MAD.) The development of technology allowed, in the 1950's and 1960's, the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to guarantee the others' end if one attacked. This checked the impulse to launch missiles. But only superpowers then had both long-range missiles and nuclear technology. In the intervening decades, lesser powers have developed both missiles and nuclear bombs. Thus, technology changed the geo-political playing field, but America has not substantively changed its strategy. Ronald Reagan's vision of SDI ("Star Wars" the critics called it), opened for wide discussion the game-changing strategy shift from destroying the other side to not being destroyed. Essentially, Reagan wondered allowed if it would not be better to not all be blown to smithereens, rather than being sure we could blow the Soviets up (after they had blown us up.)
Despite the criticism, the idea--if technologically feasible--is solid: it is better not to die, than to die knowing you have killed your killer. But as missile and nuclear technology has proliferated, we cannot be so sure mutually assured destruction even works--we cannot be sure we killed our killer, yet we might kill a lot of innocents trying. If MAD does not work--meaning their destruction cannot be guaranteed--then MAD does not deter. With no deterrence, we increase the incentive for our enemies to attack us (or at least decrease the disincentive, but nature typically abhors weakness, and tyrants tend to love to flex their muscles against their enemies, lest their own citizens turn their gazes against the tyrants.)
The decreased disincentive increases our need for another strategy. Enter missile defense. If the bully cannot land his punch, he likely won't swing. But if he can land his punch, and leave the area where he punched from, does a massive counterstrike help? Moreover, is it moral?
The moral component creeps in again. A quick and imprecise summary of "Just War" theory shows the following is needed to wage war justly:
Well, if a rogue state or terrorist cell in another country launched a nuclear missile at Los Angeles, 1, 2, and 3 are likely satisfied (although you could quibble over "winning" a nuclear exchange.) But does annihilation of the attacking nation justly respond to one missile? What if it is not even launched by the nation itself, but from a terrorist-occupied region the nation cannot control (imagine the tribal lands of Pakistan or Taliban-controlled Afghanistan)? Does the annihilation of Afghanistan really deter an Al Qaeda agent that is either a suicide bomber (on a nuclear scale) or one who can escape into caves in Pakistan before a counter attack?
Essentially, the technology disbursements since we developed MAD means MAD does not fit all--or even our most likely--threats in today's world. MAD relies on rational, big-state actors (the ones who had exclusive control of nuclear stockpiles) acting rationally and with something to lose. That's not our world.
Yet, we continue to drive policy away from defense, and rely on a ghastly offense. If we countered with dozens or hundreds of nukes against one missile, have we responded 'proportionately'? Likely not. MAD, however, would likely satisfy the 'proportionality' rule for a regular state: they could destroy us, we could respond. It is mutual, thus proportional. But highly unpleasant. But MAD, especially against Iran, North Korea, or a terrorist cell does not work. Moreover, with the terrorist cells, we cannot even "assure" the destruction of the group. So how do we justly wage war against rogue-state attacks? It seems, back to Mr. Greenfield's point, that the most "moral" solution is not to eliminate the citizens of Iran and North Korea en masse. Instead, it is better to make it impossible--or highly unlikely--for them to be able to hit us. Thus, the decision to cut missile defense from the budget, when it has the prospect not only of saving American lives, but also those of the threatening nations, does take on a moral component.
Maybe defense is the best offense.
Thomas More
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